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Predicting Intermediate and Multiple Conclusions on 
Predicate-Logic Reasoning Problems: Further 
Investigation of a Theory of Mental Logic
The mental-logic theory (ML theory) proposed by Braine and O'Brien (e.g., 1991, 1998) 
consists of the two parallel models--a mental propositional logic and its extension to a 
mental predicate logic (Braine & O'Brien, 1998). The mental propositional logic 
addresses inferences that can be drawn on the basis of logic particles such as those 
expressed with English language words such as/f, and, or, and not. The mental predicate 
logic provides further analyses of the internal composition of propositions, including 
predicate/argument structure as well as quantifiers (e.g., all, some, none) and a way of 
representing their scope.
The research reported here was designed to provide additional empirical support for the 
mental predicate logic. The logic inferences investigated are claimed to be made both in 
reasoning and in discourse processing, and since they are made routinely and easily, 
especially in discourse processing, people often do not recognize that they are making 
any inferences at all. The logic inferences are based on the meanings of English-language 
particles and quantifiers such as if, and, or, not, all, some. ML theory proposes that the 
meanings of these particles and quantifiers are given by the inferences that they sanction.
The theory consists of a core and a pragmatic part. The core part includes a set of 
inference schemas and a reasoning program that applies the schemas in lines of 
reasoning. The ML inference schemas differ from the sorts of schemas that are found in 
standard logic books in several ways, e.g., they allow concatenation of more than two 
constituents, but for simplicity of presentation the schemas are described here in a 
simpler form. In addition, in standard logic anything follows from contradictory 
premises, whereas in mental logic nothing would follow from contradictory premises, 
except a judgment that something is wrong. The pragmatic (noncore) part of the theory is 
concerned with pragmatic principles that are involved in premise interpretation and to 
make inferences that go beyond those made by the ML inference schemas (e.g., invited 
pragmatic schemas). This part is not relevant to the experiments reported here, and it will 
not be discussed further.
The theory makes a distinction between the following types of schemas: core schemas, 
feeder schemas, incompatibility schemas, and some others. People are usually more 
aware of the output of the core schemas and apply them more freely than those of the 
feeder schemas. The core schemas are applied when premises of the requisite form are 
active in working memory and the premises are considered tree (can be treated as 
assumptions). The feeder schemas are applied when their output satisfies the conditions 
of application of a core schema.
In the partial list below, those schemas that are involved in investigation reported here are 
presented. For each schema the propositional-level version is given in the first row, 
followed by corresponding predicate logic version(s). The notation is illustrated and 
explained following the first three schemas.
Core Schemas:
(1) p or q; ~p / q
S1[All X] OR S2[PRO-All X]; NEG S2[ ]; [ ] [X] / S1[ ]
S1[All X] OR S2[PRO-All X] / S2[All X: NEG S1[PRO]]
Schema 1 is a disjunction-elimination schema: When one of two alternatives is false, the 
other must be tree. The first of the predicate-logic versions can be rendered in English as 
"All of the Xs satisfy predicate S 1 or they satisfy S2; some particular object or set of 
objects, , does not satisfy S2; is included among the Xs; one can conclude that 
satisfies S 1." (The "PRO" notation usually is realized as a pronoun. This way of treating 
quantificational scope differs from standard logic and is closer to the structures of natural 
languages. For discussion of the notational system, see Braine, in press.) The second 
predicate-logic version can be rendered as "All of the Xs satisfy predicate S 1 or they 
satisfy S2; one can conclude that all of the Xs such that they do not satisfy S 1 satisfy 
S2." An example of a problem of the sort discussed later that uses the first predicate logic 
version of this schema (referring to a beads of various colors, shapes, sizes, etc.) presents 
All of the beads are green or they are small and the round beads are not small; 
application of the schema leads to the inference that the round beads are green.
(2) If p THEN q; p / q
S[All X]; [ ] [X] / S1[ ]
NEG S[~Some X~]; [ ] [X] / NEG S[ ]
At the propositional level Schema 2 is standard logic's modus ponens. The first of its 
predicate logic versions can be rendered as "All of the Xs satisfy S; some particular 
object or set of objects, , is among the Xs; it can be concluded that a satisfies S. The 
second can be rendered as "There is no X that satisfies S; some particular object, , is 
included among the Xs; it can be concluded that a does not satisfy S." (The tildes around 
"Some X" indicate that it is within the scope of the negation and can be instantiated. 
"NEG S[Some X]" would indicate that "some X is not S." One could not then conclude 
that a is not an X. (Note that the meaning of the quantifier is given by the inferences 
about instantiation, i.e., which objects can or cannot satisfy the predicate.) An example of 
a problem that uses the second predicate-logic versions of the schema (referring to some 
children in a school) has as premises None of the children wearing red shins are playing 
basketball and all the boys are wearing red shirts leads to the conclusion that the boys 
are not playing basketball.
(3) ~(p & q); p / ~q
NEG E[~Some X : S1[PRO-ALL X] & S2[PRO]~]; S2[ ]; [ ] [X] / 
NEG S1[ ]
NEG(S1[All X] & S2[PRO-All X] / NEG S2[All X: S1[PRO]]
Schema 3 concerns negative-conjunction elimination. The first predicate-logic version 
can be rendered "There is not some X such that it satisfies S1 and satisfies S2; some 
particular object, , satisfies S2; is included among the Xs; one can conclude that 
does not satisfy S1. The second predicate-logic version can be rendered "Not all of the Xs 
satisfy both S1 and S2; one can conclude that the Xs that satisfy S 1 do not satisfy S2." 
An example of a problem that uses the propositional-level version of this schema 
(referring to a box containing toy animals) has as premises It is false that there is both a 
camel and a monkey in the box and there is a camel; one can infer that there is not a 
monkey in the box.
(4) p OR q; If p THEN r; If q THEN r / r
S[All X] OR S2[PRO-All X]; S3[All X: S1[PRO]]; S3[All X: S2[PRO]] / 
S3[All X]
(5) p OR q; If p THEN r; If q THEN s / r OR s
S1[All X] OR S2[Pro-All X]; S3[All X: S1[PRO]]; S4[All X; S2[PRO]] / 
S3[All X] OR S4[PRO-All X]
Principal Feeder Schemas:
(6) p; q / p & q 
S1[All X]; S2[All X] / S1 [All X] & S2[PRO-All X]
(7) p & q / p
S1[Q X] & S2[PRO-Q X] / S2 [Q X]
(Q refers to any quantifier, e.g. all, some, many, few).
Incompatibility Schemas:
(8) p; ~p / incompatible
S[All X]; NEG S[Q X] / incompatible
S[Q X]; NEG S[All X] / incompatible
(9) p or q; ~p & ~q / incompatible
S[All X] OR S2[All X]; NEG S1[Q X] AND NEG S2[PRO-Q X] / 
incompatible
S[Q X] OR S2[PRO-Q X]; NEG S1[All X] & NEG S2[All X] / 
incompatible
The reasoning program that implements the inference schemas includes a direct 
reasoning routine (DRR) and some indirect reasoning strategies that go beyond the DRR. 
The theory predicts that inferences made through application of the DRR are essentially 
available to everyone and are made routinely and effortlessly. The DRR is considered to 
be the first facility that is used in logical reasoning and it consists of three parts. A 
preliminary procedure determines if there is a conclusion to be evaluated. If there is a 
tentative conclusion of the form if-then, the preliminary procedure adds its antecedent to 
the premise set and treats its consequent as a conclusion to be evaluated. An evaluation 
procedure leads to either a "true" or "false" response. A "true" response results from 
conclusion being in the premise set being inferred from the premise set by application of 
one or a combination of the schemas. The "false" response is made when a proposition 
reached that is incompatible on Schemas 8 or 9 with a premise or with a proposition that 
has been inferred. An inference procedure applies any core schema whenever its 
conditions have been met, i.e., whenever its requisite propositions are considered 
conjointly in working memory; the feeder schemas are applied only when their output 
would provide for the conditionals of a core schema to be met (or a possible one-time 
application to feed a conclusion). Finally, when a topic set is present (either because of 
some strategic consideration or because it has been provided), any core schema that 
makes an inference about that topic is applied. Neither the schemas nor the reasoning 
program provide any means for making indeterminacy judgments, i.e., that the truth or 
falsity of some conclusion is uncertain given a set of premises, and the schemas involved 
in making incompatibility judgments are not sufficient for judging the consistency of 
large or complex premise sets.
Unlike the DRR, the indirect reasoning strategies are not claimed to be universally 
available and their application requires effort (although Braine, Reiser, and Rumain, 
1984, reported that some strategies are available to many college students, and are 
presumed to be available in other populations). Consequently, ML theory predicts that 
inferences requiring any of the indirect-reasoning strategies would be made far less often 
than those that follow from DRR. The indirect-reasoning strategies are not described here 
because they are not required on any of the problems reported here.
Several sorts of supportive evidence have been reported to support ML theory, although 
most of the investigations have addressed only the propositional-level of the theory: The 
theory has predicted successfully which reasoning problems people solve, the perceived 
relative difficulties of those problems, the order in which intermediate inferences are 
made in lines of reasoning, which logical inferences are made routinely and effortlessly 
in text comprehension, and has established that those inference are made on line as the 
information enters working memory.
The data reported by Braine et al. (1984) clearly support the most basic prediction of ML 
theory, i.e., that inferences that follow from application of the DRR will be made 
routinely, and those requiting reasoning resources beyond the DRR will be made far less 
often. Participants were presented with two types of problems: Fifty-four problems were 
solvable by application of the propositional schemas and the DRR, and another 19 
problems required reasoning strategies that go beyond the DRR. Each problem presented 
a set of premises together with a conclusion to be evaluated as tree or false. To minimize 
potential content interference with solution, all problems referred to letters written on an 
imaginary blackboard (e.g., "If there is an F on the blackboard, there is a W."). Errors 
were not significantly associated with problem length, and as was expected, almost no 
errors were made on the direct-reasoning problems. On the problems that required more 
sophisticated reasoning strategies, however, errors often were made. Subsequent 
investigations (e.g., Braine, O'Brien, Noveck, Samuels, Fisch, Lea and Yang, 1995; 
O'Brien, Braine, and Yang, 1994) provided further evidence for ML theory. In these 
investigations participants were able to make the predicted inferences both when the 
problems were presented with conclusions to be evaluated, or with just premises from 
which participants were asked to write down everything that follows, without any 
conclusion to be evaluated. Again, as predicted, very few errors were made on direct 
reasoning problems.
Braine et al. (1984) provided an additional sort of evidence to support the claim that not 
only were their direct-reasoning problems being solved, but that they were being solved 
in the way described by the DRR. The participants were directed to rate the perceived 
relative difficulty of each problem on a Lichert-type scale, and Braine et al. constructed a 
regression model from the perceived-difficulty rating data that assigned a weight to each 
schema. This enabled prediction of the difficulty of each problem (as being equal to the 
sum of the weights of each schema required for problem solution as predicted by the 
DRR). For example, a problem with premises of the form p or q, If q then r, not both r 
and s, and not p, and requiring evaluation of not s would lead first to the application of 
Schema 1 to the first and last of the premises, which yields q, then to application of 
Schema 2, which yields r, and finally to application of Schema 3, which yields not s; the 
predicted difficulty of this problem is the sum of the difficulty weights for Schemas 1, 2, 
and 3. Correlations between predicted and observed difficulties accounted for 66% of the 
variance (53% with problem length partialed out), even when the weights were obtained 
with one set of problems and the observed ratings were obtained with another set of 
problems and different participants. Yang, Braine, and O'Brien (1998) conducted a 
similar investigation of direct-reasoning predicate-logic problems. Again, almost no 
errors were made in assessing the conclusions and again the ratings predicted by the 
schema weights correlated highly with the observed rating (69% of the variance; 56% 
when problem length was partialed out). even when observed ratings came from new 
problems and different participants than those used to generate the schema weights.
The sort of evidence provided by Braine et al. (1984) and Yang et al. (1998) is supportive 
of the mental-logic account, but only indirectly addresses whether participants were 
constructing the predicted lines of reasoning. A more direct sort of evidence has been 
reported for the propositional-level schemas by Braine et al. (1995) and O'Brien et al. 
(1994). In these studies, participants were asked to write down every step in their 
reasoning process, i.e., to write things down in the order that they figured things out. 
Some problems presented conclusions to be evaluated and participants were asked to 
write down everything they figured out on the way to their final judgment; other 
problems presented only premises and on these problems participants were asked to write 
down everything they could figure out from the premises in the order that they figured 
things out.
Consider a problem presented in O'Brien et al. (1994), referring to letters written on an 
imaginary blackboard, with premises of the form N or P; not N, if P then H, if H then Z, 
and not both Z and S. The DRR applies Schema 3 to the first two premises to infer P, 
which then leads with the third premise to application of Schema 7 to infer H, which then 
leads with the fourth premise to application of Schema 7 to infer Z, and, finally, with the 
fifth premise, to application of Schema 4 to infer not S. Now consider another problem 
from O'Brien et al. with the same premises presented in the reverse order: not both Z and 
S, if H then Z, if P then H, not N, and N or P. The DRR is unable to apply any of the core 
schemas until all of the premises have been read, applying Schema 4 to premises 4 and 5 
to infer P, then applying Schema 7 to infer H, then Schema 7 to infer Z,. then Schema 3 
to infer not S. Note that the DRR leads to the same sequence of intermediate inferences 
and to the same final conclusion on both problems. (A reasoner might use strategies that 
go beyond the DRR on the latter problem, for example first inferring If H then not S, but 
this does not lead to any additional inferences, and O'Brien et al. found that the only 
commonly made inferences were those predicted by the DRR). The order of predicted 
inferences is determined by the order in which the Core schemas become available (not 
by the order in which the premises are presented), and O'Brien et al. found that the order 
in which participants wrote down inferences on both problems corresponded to those 
predicted by the DRR.
Several investigations have provided evidence for the mental-logic inferences in text 
processing (e.g., Lea, O'Brien, Fisch, Noveck, & Braine, 1990; Lea, 1995), finding that 
the core inferences are made routinely when their premises are embedded within short 
story vignettes; further, these inferences are made so easily that people usually do not 
realize that any inferences are being made at all. Unlike other sorts of inferences made 
while reading, e.g., inferences from story grammars, scripts, etc., which are made only 
when they are bridging inferences, i.e., required to maintain textual coherence, the 
mental-logic inferences are made so long as their requisite premises are held conjointly in 
working memory.
There is, thus, an abundance of evidence in favor of the predictions of ML theory, but to 
date only the Yang et al. (1998) studies described earlier have assessed the predicate-
logic schemas, and those studies provided only indirect evidence that the predicate-logic 
reasoning problems were being solved using the lines of reasoning predicted by the DRR 
and the mental predicate-logic schemas. The motivation for the experiments reported here 
was to provide some direct evidence for the lines of reasoning predicted for such 
problems. The basic strategy was adopted from Braine et al. (1995) and O'Brien et al. 
(1994). As described earlier, those studies presented premises and required participants to 
write down everything that could be figured out from the premises in the order in which 
things were figured out. The problems presented here similarly required that each step in 
the reasoning processes be written down.
For the predicate-logic problems presented here, participants were asked to write down 
everything about the topic set that could be figured out from the premises. Table 1 shows 
the line of inferences that are predicted by the DRR for Problem Set 1. These problems 
were designed to be maximally simple, in that the inferences predicted by the DRR could 
be applied as each premise was read, i.e., the problems were constructed so that 
inferences could be made in the same order as the premises were presented. Problem Set 
2 was identical, except that the order in which the premises were presented was random. 
(Table 1 shows the order in which the premises of Problem Set 2 were presented.) It was 
predicted that the line of inferences written down on these problems would not differ 
from those predicted for Problem Set 1. This prediction follows from the principle that 
the order of inferences will be governed by the availability of inference schemas rather 
than by the order in which premises are encountered.
Experiment 2 replicated the problem forms presented in Experiment 1; the problem 
content differed, however, between the two experiments. Whereas the problems in 
Experiment 1 concerned beads of various shapes, sizes, patterns, etc., the problems in 
Experiment 2 concerned the actions and attributes of various groups of children. It was 





Fifty undergraduate students who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at 
Baruch College participated to fulfill a course requirement. Twenty six of the participants 
received Problem Set 1, and 24 received Problem Set 2. Eleven of the participants either 
did not follow instructions or failed to respond to every problem, and data from these are 
not included in the reported results, leaving data from 21 participants for Problem Set 1 
and 18 for Problem Set 2.
Tasks and Procedures.
Twenty predicate-logic reasoning problems were constructed to constitute Problem Set 1. 
The problems were constructed so that the predicate-logic schemas can be applied as the 
premises were read. For example, Problem 1 (see Table 1) allows application of Schema 
3 as soon as the first two premises are read. This allows Schema 2 to be applied when the 
third premise is read, and then to Schema 3 as the fourth premise is read. Participants 
were told that the problems referred to some beads made by a bead manufacturer. The 
beads have various colors (for example, some are red, some are blue, some green), 
various shapes (for example, some are round, some are square, some are triangular), 
various materials (for example, some are plastic, some are metal, some are wooden), and 
various patterns (for example, some are striped, some are plain). Each problem referred to 
the beads in a particular bag. Each problem presented some facts about the beads in that 
bag, and then asks a question about what you can figure out from the facts. The facts 
were presented first, and then, below a line, the question was presented. Participants were 
told to write their answers in the space below the question, which asked them to write 
down, in the order they figured things out, everything that they could figure out about a 
topic that was presented. The problems, their topics, and the predicted lines of reasoning 
are presented in Table 1. A second set of problems (Problem Set 2) was constructed that 
was identical to the set shown in Table 1, except that the premises were presented in 
random order, thus requiring participants to search for the premises that allow application 
of a schema. Table 1 indicates within parentheses following each premise the order in 
which the premises were presented in Problem Set 2.
The task was administered in small groups (n < 10 per group). Each participant was 
presented one set of problems. Order of problems within each problem set was 
randomized, with two random orders constructed. Participants were assigned randomly to 
problem sets and problem orders.
Results and Discussion
In scoring participant's responses the following guidelines were used. First, some 
participants occasionally wrote down premises. Since these responses did not seem to be 
activated by any particular circumstances, and could not be counted for or against ML 
theory or other theories, they were omitted from all tallies. Second, participants 
infrequently would repeat previously made responses, and since they were already scored 
they were ignored second time. Third, occasionally a participant would write down an 
inference with the form if-then, where the if-clause was either a premise or a previously 
written-down inference. In these cases, the if-clause seemed to be stating a reason for 
inferring the then-clause, so only the then-clause was included in the scoring. Fourth, in a 
few cases responses deviated from predicted response only by the inclusion or omission 
of and. For example participants would occasionally write down predicted inferences 
conjoined with a premise or the output of another inference, or in instances in which the 
model predicted a conjunction, participants sometimes wrote down the components of the 
conjunction on separate lines. Those responses account for the optional one-time use of 
feeder schemas at the readout stage and were not listed separately. Finally, some subjects 
tended to write down negative inferences, e.g., "the large beads are not red," by 
enumerating the possible positive compliments, e.g., "the large beads are green, or blue, 
and so forth." Such responses were scored as negative inferences.
The responses obtained from the participants were compared to the predicted responses 
listed in Table 1. For each predicted inference in Table 1, the proportion of participants 
who wrote down that inference is indicated (Problem Set 1 first, followed by Premise Set 
2). For the 20 problems, ML theory predicts that 51 inferences would be written down. 
(ML theory predicts that the output of the core schemas applied by the DRR would be 
written down; previous investigations have reported that the output of the feeder schemas 
in not typically written down, as these inferences are thought to be paraphrases rather 
than inferences. For the 20 problems, the theory predicts application 1 core schemas 51 
times.) For the 21 participants receiving Problem Set 1, this leads to prediction of 1071 
responses (i.e., inferences written down), of which 76% were written down.
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the proportions with which predicted responses were 
made were not equal across all problems and inferences. For example, on several 
problems some of the earlier inferences in the predicted lines of reasoning tended to be 
written down less often than the final inference (e.g., problems 2, 5, 7, 11, 17, 18, and 
19). For the most part the intermediate inferences that were not written down involved 
schemas 1, 2, and 3 when they were applied early in a line of reasoning; inferences made 
from application of the same schemas as the last inference in a line of reasoning were 
almost always written down. Thus, failure to write down such inferences early in a line of 
reasoning does not seem to indicate that the inferences were not made, but rather to 
indicate that they seemed less important than the final output of the reasoning processes. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that over 95% of multiple inferences were 
written down in the predicted order, suggesting that participants were constructing the 
lines of reasoning that were predicted, but failed to write down every step in the 
processes.
For Problem Set 2 with 18 participants the theory predicts 918 responses, of which 80% 
were written down. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the data for Problem Set 2 were 
extremely similar to those for Problem Set I. Most striking is the fact that the order of 
inferences written down were consistent with those predicted by the DRR (94.25% of the 
time), even though the premises were not presented in an order that was consistent with 
such output unless the reasoning process was guided by the availability of the schemas 
rather than by the order of premise input. It is not obvious what theoretical account could 
be provided for this consistency of output ordering except for the schema-availability 
account provided by ML theory.
The only sort of problems on which participants did not conform consistently with the 
predicted output of ML theory were those that required application of schema 5. Even so, 
on these problems (problems 4 and 9) a majority of participants wrote down the lines of 
reasoning predicted by ML theory, although a large minority did not. Most of those 
participants who did not write down the Predicted lines of reasoning on these two 
problems instead wrote down lines of reasoning that were consistent with a supposition-
of-alternative strategy. This strategy, described above, constructs two suppositional lines 
of reasoning, one under each of the two alternatives of a disjunctive premise. On problem 
3, for example, this sort of line of reasoning results in the intermediate inference that the 
beads are wooden and square or mental and triangular rather than the beads are square 
or triangular. For Problem Set 1, such inferences constituted 29% of the intermediate 
inferences on problem 3 and 38% on problem 9, and taken together with the output 
predicted by the DRR, they made up 91% and 95% of the responses to problems 3 and 9, 
respectively. For Problem Set 2, such inferences constituted 44% of the intermediate 
inferences on problem 3 and 22% on problem 9, and taken together with the intermediate 
inferences predicted by the DRR, they constituted 66% and 89% of the intermediate 
inferences on problems 3 and 9, respectively.
In summary, participants made the vast majority of both the intermediate and final 
inferences predicted by ML theory. More importantly, these inferences were almost 
always made in the predicted order, even when the premises were not presented in an 




Fifty-two undergraduate students who were enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course at Baruch College participated to fulfill a course requirement. Several participants 
either did not provide responses to all problems or did not follow instructions, and their 
data are not included, leaving a total of 21 participants for Problem Set 1 and 20 
participants for Problem Set 2.
Tasks and Procedures.
The problems were identical in logical form to those in Experiment 1, but with different 
content. Unlike the problems of Experiment 1, which referred to beads in a bag, the 
problems in Experiment 2 presented narrative information about different groups of 
children in Brazil. (By placing the children in the stories in an unfamiliar society, 
participants should be less likely to import information from long-term memory into their 
lines of reasoning.) Participants were told that the children are in different places, are 
wearing different sorts of clothes, are doing different sorts of things, and so forth. Each 
problem presents some facts about the particular group of children for that problem. Each 
problem presented a topic, and participants were told to write down everything they could 
figure out about that topic from the facts in the order that they figured things out. The 
premises for the problems and the predicted inferences are shown in Table 2.
Results and Discussion
The scoring guidelines were same as those used in Experiment 1. Table 2 shows the 
proportions with which each of the predicted inferences for each problem were given for 
the problems both in Problem Set 1 and Problem Set 2. For Problem Set 1 a total of 1,071 
inferences were predicted (51 inferences x 21 participants), of which 76% were written 
down, and for Problem Set 2 a total of 1020 inferences were predicted (51 inferences x 
20 participants), of which 84% were written down.
Inspection of Table 2 reveals a pattern of responses that is quite similar to those of 
Experiment 1. Comparisons of responses that were written down and inferences that were 
predicted were not distributed equally across problems and inferences, and as in 
Experiment 1 participants often failed to write down inferences early in lines of 
reasoning, but almost always included final inferences, and this was the case also in 
Experiment 2. Again, the strongest evidence that participants were making inferences in 
the order predicted by the DRR was that 97% of multiple inferences were written down 
in the order predicted in Problem Set 1, and 96% of multiple inferences were written 
down in the predicted order for the problems in Problem Set 2, where such an order was 
at variance with the presented premise order. Thus, for the problems in Experiment 2, as 
well as for their formal parallels in Experiment 1, the order in which inferences were 
written down was predicted successfully by the availability of the schemas rather than by 
the order in which information was presented.
As in Experiment 1, on those problems requiring application of schema 5, e.g., problems 
3 and 9, a large number of participants revealed lines of reasoning that went beyond what 
is available on the DRR, instead writing down inferences that are consistent with a 
supposition-of-alternatives strategy. For example, problem 3 led to the older children are 
wearing red shirts and selling Jornal do Brasil or they are wearing blue shirts and 
selling 0 Globo. Given that Braine et al. (1995) did not report the use of such a strategy 
on problems requiring schema 5 when the problems were presented at the propositional 
rather than predicate level, the question is raised as to whether the greater complexity of 
the information in the predicate-logic level encourages reasoners to keep track of the 
information more carefully, and following the supposition-of-alternatives strategy allows 
just this.
Contents of the "Other" Responses in Experiments 1 
and 2
Of course, not everything written down was an inference predicted by ML theory. 
Knowing what metric to use to assess how many nonpredicted inferences were written 
down is problematic, for the possibilities concerning what could be written down, and 
how things could be written down, was undefined. Some participants went beyond 
writing down inferences that depend on the logic particles and quantifiers. For example, 
one participant responded to problem 3 of Problem Set 2 by developing a narrative in 
which the red and blue shirts worn by children selling the two sorts of newspapers were 
colors signifying two drug gangs, "like the Bloods and the Crips," and the two 
newspapers were a code for different drags they were dealing. Inclusion of such 
extralogical inferences was not included in the tabluations presented in Tables 1 and 2, 
and such inferences are not germane to the question of whether the predicted inferences 
are made. ML theory proposes that the inferences made from application of the schemas 
can cohabit in the same lines of reasoning with inferences from a variety of other sources, 
such as those following from scripts, story grammars, and so forth, and there is nothing in 
making such extralogical inferences that bears on whether the logic inferences are being 
made. (Indeed, the participant who wrote down that the colors signified gang affiliations 
also made the inferences predicted by ML theory.) How often such inferences were made 
is difficult to quantify, because there is no theory about them. How many inferences, for 
example, should be counted when someone writes down that the shirts designate different 
gangs selling different drags? Such inferences, however, clearly were made much less 
often than those counted as predicted by ML theory that were counted in Tables 1 and 2.
One possible source of nonpredicted inferences that were made concerns invited 
inferences and conversational implicatures, e.g., interpreting disjunction as exclusive 
rather than inclusive, or converting propositions of the form All P are Q to All Q are P. 
Although such inferences are the focus of much attention in the reasoning literature (see 
discussions in Braine & O'Brien, 1998), they were relatively rare in the protocols here. 
Another possible source of nonpredicted responses would be standard logic, which would 
allow for many logical inferences that would not be made by the schemas of ML theory. 
No such inferences were written down by any participant. A final possible source of 
nonpredicted inferences would be the use of the feeder schemas, e.g., schemas 6 and 7. 
Such inferences were made, but they did not occur very often. In brief, the only sort of 
inferences that were made frequently were those reported in the results sections for 
Experiments 1 and 2.
General Discussion
The experiments reported here provide additional evidence for a mental predicate logic. 
Unlike the investigation of Yang et al. (1998), which provided only indirect evidence, the 
present studies provide direct evidence that participants applied the proposed inference 
schemas. The most persuasive evidence comes from Problem Sets 2 in both Experiments 
1 and 2, in which participants wrote down inferences in the order predicted by the 
availability of the schemas, even though the premise information was not presented in a 
way that would lead to such lines of reasoning otherwise. In comparison to the inferences 
predicted by ML theory, relatively few inferences of any other sort were made in any 
systematic fashion. The best explanation for the data reported in the present study, 
therefore, seems to be the ML theory for reasoning with predicate-logic premises.
It is a fair question, of course, as to whether any other psychological theory of reasoning 
could provide as equally good an account of these data. Only two other theories are 
available that would claim to explain such reasoning: the mental-logic theory of Rips 
(e.g., Rips, 1994) and the mental-models theory of Johnson-Laird and his associates (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Neither theory, however, seems capable of providing a 
clear account of how the problems reported here would be solved. Let us consider first 
Rips's theory. First, Rips's theory allows for few inferences to be made without specific 
conclusions to be tested. How the theory would make inferences when only a topic set is 
provided is yet to be specified. Second, Rips's theory apparently would lead to the 
prediction that many of the problems presented here would be quite difficult, when, in 
fact, participants had little difficulty in arriving at a final inference (in many cases 
without disagreement among participants). Finally, it is a quantifier-free representational 
system. In standard logic, a universally quantified sentence can be represented with a 
universal quantifier followed by a conditional sentence, e.g., All the red beads are plastic
can be represented as For every bead, if it is red then it is plastic. In Rips's system, it 
becomes: If Red (x), Then Plastic (x), where x is the individual variable BEADS and the 
universal quantifier is eliminated. An existentially quantified sentence can be represented 
with an existential quantifier followed by a conjunction, e.g., There are some red plastic 
beads can be represented as There exist some beads that are red and plastic. In Rips's 
system, it becomes, "Red (a) and Plastic (a)," where a is a temporary name or a constant 
that had not occurred in the preceding undischarged steps. By using this quantifier-free 
representation, the inference rules defined for a propositional-level logic may sometimes 
be used in quantified predicate reasoning. The data reported here reveal no tendencies to 
treat universal propositions as conditionals, nor existential propositions as conjunctions, 
as they should according to Rips's theory.
The mental models approach of Johnson-Laird and his colleagues has addressed 
reasoning with predicate-logic premises in two sets of work, one concerning Aristotelian 
syllogisms and the other concerning what they refer to as "multiple quantification." The 
two sets provide quite different sorts of models, and of the two, the more pertinent is the 
work on syllogisms. (The work on multiply quantified propositions has been limited to 
whether various objects are, or are not, in the same location; it has represented the 
quantifiers quite differently than has the work about predicate syllogisms.) As an 
example of their approach, consider the two premises, All beads are green and All green 
things are round, which lead to the following models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, p. 
121):
[b] g; [g] r; [[b] g] r
[b] g [g] r [[b] g]
...
The first two columns represent the first premise, with the first two rows containing 
tokens for green beads and the third row (the ellipsis) indicating the possibility of other 
objects. Columns three and four represent the second premise, with the first two rows 
containing tokens for round green things and the third row again indicating the possibility 
of other objects. Finally, columns 5 - 7 represent the combination of information from the 
models for premises one and two, with the first two rows containing tokens for green 
round beads and the third row again indicating the possibility of some other things. The 
square brackets indicate exhaustivity; for example, in the models in columns one and 
two, the brackets indicate that no further models can be included that have a token for 
bead without having a token for green. The nested bracketing in the models in rows 5 - 7 
indicate that beads are exhausted in relation to green, and green is exhausted in relation to 
round. The modelers state that the final model supports the conclusion that All beads are 
round. This way of representing quantified propositions can be applied to premises of the 
sort presented in the problems reported here, although not without encountering some 
difficulties. Consider the premises all the beads are red and all the beads are metal, 
which could lead to the following set of models (omitting the redundant models, as will 
be done henceforth):
[b] r; [b] m; [b] r m
Note that the structure of this model differs somewhat from what Johnson-Laird and his 
associates described above, in that the square brackets cannot be nested because, unlike 
the Aristotelian syllogisms, these premises contain no middle term. The final model, 
however, does appear to support the conclusion that all beads are red metal beads, which 
was the conclusion to be evaluated by subjects. Representation by models of other 
problems is often less obvious. Consider the premise that there are no square wooden 
beads. Johnson-Laird and Byme (1991, p. 120) stated that a universal negative 




Application of this structure to there are no square wooden beads is problematic. Note 





because to do so would preclude the possibility of there being a wooden bead, or a square 
bead, or a square wooden thing that is not a bead, and these possibilities clearly should be 








Note that adding one term to the proposition would expand the required models, e.g., 
there are no large square wooden beads would require 12 explicit models. Given that 
models theory claims that the principal source of difficulty in reasoning stems from 
limitations in working memory, making complex or lengthy models intractable, such 
premises would quickly make such problems intractable. Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and 
Schaeken (1994) suggested that in such situations a reasoner would seek simpler ways to 
model the information. What such a simpler way would be for this sort of premise, 
however, is unclear. For example, one might propose that there are no square wooden 




or one might take the proposition to mean that wooden beads are not square beads, and 
vice versa, leading possibly to: 
[b s]
[b w]
The choice is not trivial; choosing one way over another to represent the proposition 
leads to quite different final models, and thus quite different conclusions would be drawn. 
Among the final model sets that might be drawn from the premises of Problem 36, 
depending on how one decides to represent the premises and treat combinations and their 












Note that not all of these models would lead in any obvious way to the conclusion that 
would be drawn from application of the mental-logic schemas, i.e., that it is the green 
beads that are not wooden. Until the models theorists provide greater specificity to the 
way quantified propositions are represented and combined, it remains problematic as to 
how one should compare the models treatment of the problems presented in the present 
work to the mental-logic treatment: The models theory provides no clear guidance about 
how people will reason with these problems.
The conclusion is inescapable: To date ML theory provides the only plausible account of 
reasoning on problems of the sort reported here. ML theory predicted successfully which 
inferences would be drawn and the orders of the intermediate inferences drawn on the 
way to making a final inferences. Most significantly, ML theory successfully predicted 
the order in which inferences would be written down, even when the premises were 
presented in orders that did not correspond to the output of the reasoning processes. 
Clearly, the present investigation only fills in one part of a larger investigation into 
reasoning of a predicate-logic sort. It does, however, provide some direct evidence that
participants were solving the problems in the way described by ML theory.
References
Braine, M.D.S., and O'Brien, DP. (Eds.) (in press). Mental logic. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Braine, M.D.S., O'Brien, DP., Noveck, I.A., Samuels, M., Fisch, SM., Lea, R.B., and 
Yang, Y. (1995). Predicting intermediate and multiple conclusions in propositional logic 
inference problems: Further evidence for a mental logic. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 124 263-292
Braine, M.D.S., Reiser, B.J., and Rumain, B. (1984). Some empirical justification for a 
theory of natural propositional logic. In G. Bower (Ed.) The psychology of learning and 
motivation: Advance in research and theory. (Vol. 18). New York: Academic Press 
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R. MJ., and Shaeken, W. (1994). Propositional Reasoning by 
Models. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673
Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates
Lea, R.B. (1995). On-line evidence for elaborative logical inference in text. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 21, 1469-1482
O'Brien, D.P., Braine, M.D.S., and Yang, Y. (1994). Propositional reasoning by mental 
models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice. Psychological Review 101, 711-
724
Rips, L.J. (1990). Reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology, 41,321-353. Yang, Y., 
Braine, M.D.S., and O'Bfien, D.P. (in press)
Table 1
Premises. Topics. and Responses Predicted by the Direct-Reasoning Routine for Problem 
Set 1 in Experiment 1. Together With the Proportions With Which Those Responses 
Were Given to Problem Set 1 and Problem Set 2 of Experiment 1
Percent written 
down 
Percent in predicted 
ordera
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2
n=21 n= 18
1. None of the red beads are square (3)b
All of the beads are triangular or square 
(1)
The triangular beads are striped (2)
None of the striped beads are wooden (4) 
Topic: the red beads
DRR Output:
The red beads are triangular 1.00 1.00
The red beads are striped .95 .89
None of the red beads are wooden .90 .93 .95 .93
2. The square beads are metal (2)
There are no red metal beads (3)
Every bead is either red or green (1) 
Topic: the square beads
DRR Output:
The square beads are not red .48 .61
The square beads are green .95 .94 .88 1.00
3.All the large beads are wooden or metal 
(2)
The wooden beads are square (3)
The metal beads are triangular (1)
All of the square beads are blue (5)
All of the triangular beads are blue (4) 
Topic: the large beads
DRR Output::
The large beads are square or triangular .62 .44
The large beads are blue .67 .78 .85 .86
4. The plastic beads are red (3)
All the beads are square (2)
The square red beads are not large (1) 
Topic: the plastic beads
DRR Output::
The plastic beads are red and squarea .72 .83
The plastic beads are not large .95 .83 .88 .87
5. The square beads are small (1)
All the beads are red (4)
All the small red beads are wooden (2)
None of the wooden beads are striped (3) 
Topic: the square beads
DRR Output::
The square beads are red .33 .22
The square beads are small and red .67 .78
The square beads are wooden 1.00 .94
The square beads are not striped .95 .94 .94 1.00
6. All the round beads are red or green (2)
The red beads are wooden (4)
The green beads are wooden (3)
There are no striped wooden beads (1) 
Topic: the round beads
DRR Output::
The round beads are wooden .95 .78
The round beads are not striped .90 1.00 1.00 1.00
7. All the triangular beads are wooden (1)
There are no red wooden beads (3)
Every bead is either red or green (2) 
Topic: the triangular beads
DRR Output::
The triangular beads are not red .43 .67
The triangular beads are green 1.00 .94 1.00 .93
8. Some of the beads are wooden (3)
The wooden beads are either round or 
square (2)
None of the beads are round (4)
There are no square striped beads (1) 
Topic: the wooden beads
DRR Output::
The wooden beads are square 1.00 1.00
The wooden beads are not striped .95 .89 .96 1.00
9. Some of the beads are round (3)
All the beads are plastic or wooden (1)
The wooden beads are red (4)
The plastic beads are blue (2) 
Topic: the round beads
DRR Output::
The round beads are plastic or wooden .57 .67
The round beads are red or blue .52 .72 1.00 1.00
10. The green beads are not triangular (1)
The large beads are metal
All the beads are triangular or square (3)
There are no square wooden beads (2) 
Topic: the green beads
DRR Output::
The green beads are square .95 1.00
The green beads are not wooden .90 1.00 1.00 1.00
11. The large beads are either green or 
blue (6)
None of the green beads are triangular (3)
None of the blue beads are triangular (1)
Every bead is triangular or square (2)
None of the square beads are plain (5)
The beads are either plain or metal (4) 
Topic: the large beads
DRR Output::
The large beads are not triangular .29 .50
The large beads are square .86 .78
The large beads are not plain .38 .73
The large beads are metal 1.00 .73 1.00 .86
12. The green round beads are plastic (2)
The blue round beads are plastic (3)
All the beads are green or blue (1)
The plastic beads are striped (5)
None of the striped beads are large (4) 
Topic: the round beads
DRR Output::
The round beads are green or blue .86 .11
The round beads are plastic .90 .89
The round beads are striped .95 .89
The round beads are not large .95 .89
13. Some of the round beads are not 
plastic (2)
All of the beads are plastic or wooden (3)
There are no blue wooden beads (1) 
Topic: the round beads
DRR Output:
Some of the round beads are wooden .86 .94
Some of the round beads are not blue .81 .88 1.00 1.00
14. All the large beads are triangular or 
square (2)
The triangular beads are red and metal (3)
The square beads are metal (1)
There are no plain metal beads (4) 
Topic: the large beads
DRR Output:
The large beads are metal .76 .78
The large beads are not plain .76 .78 1.00 1.00
15. The striped beads are either metal or 
plastic (2)
None of the beads are metal (3)
There are no blue plastic beads (1) 
Topic: the striped beads
DRR Output:
The striped beads are plastic 1.00 .89
The striped beads are not blue .90 .72 .95 .92
16. The triangular beads are blue
and none of them are wooden (4)
All the beads are metal or wooden (3)
None of the metal beads are striped (2)
All of the beads are striped or plain (1) 
Topic: the triangular beads
DRR Output:
The triangular beads are metal 1.00 .94
The triangular beads are not striped .43 .83
The triangular beads are plain 1.00 .94 .95 .86
17. The round beads are wooden (4)
There are no green wooden beads (1)
Every bead is red or green (2)
The red beads are square (9) 
Topic: the round beads
DRR Output:
The round beads are not green .38 .94
The round beads are red .76 .89
The round beads are square .81 .89 .95 .94
18. Some of the red beads are metal (2)
There are no square metal beads (1)
Every bead is either square or triangular 
(3) 
Topic: the red beads
DRR Output:
Some of the red beads are not square .24 .67
Some of the red beads are triangular .86 .89 .87 1.00
19. The blue beads are round (2)
The blue beads are not plastic (4)
All the beads are either plastic or wooden 
(1)
The round wooden beads are large (3) 
Topic: the blue beads
DRR Output:
The blue beads are wooden .44 .40
The blue beads are round and wooden .90 .89
The blue beads are large .86 .94 .90 1.00
20. Some of the large beads are striped (4)
Every bead is square (1)
All the striped square beads are metal (2)
There are no red metal beads (3) 
Topic: the large beads
DRR Output:
Some of the large beads are striped and 
square
.86 .89
Some of the large beads are metal .90 .89
Some of the large beads are not red .76 .83 .97 .88
Note: On each problem, the premises are presented above the line, and the predicted 
inferences of the DRR are presented below the line.
a For each problem, this indicates the proportion of those predicted inferences that were 
written down that were written down in the order predicted by the DRR.
b Indicates the order in which the premises were presented for Problem Set 2.
Table 2
Premises. Topics. and Responses Predicted by the Direct-Reasoning Routine for Problem 
Set 1 in Experiment 2. Together With the Proportions With Which Those Responses 
Were Given to Problem Set 1 and Problem Set 2 of Experiment 2
Percent written down Percent in predicted ordera
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2
n=21 n= 
1. None of the children wearing 
shoes are watching videos. (3)b
All of the children are either 
washing dishes or watching 
videos.(2)
The children washing dishes are 
indoors. (1)
None of the children who are 
indoors are being punished. (4) 
Topic: the children wearing shoes
DRR Output::
The children wearing shoes are 
washing dishes
1.00 .95
The children wearing shoes are 
indoors
.81 .80
The children wearing shoes are 
not being punished
.71 .85 .93 .94
Other
2. All the girls are in the 
cafeteria. (2)
There are no children eating 
beans in the cafeteria. (3)
Every child is eating either beans 
or fruit (1) 
Topic: the girls
DRR Output::
The girls are not eating beans .43 .75
The girls are eating fruit 1.00 .95 1.00 1.00
Other
3. All the older children are 
wearing either red or blue shirts 
(2)
All the children in blue shirts are 
selling the "O Globo". (a 
newspaper) (3)
The children in red shirts are 
selling "Jomal do Brasil". (a 
newspaper) (1)
All of the children who sell "O 
Globo" are tired. (5)
All of the children who sell 
"Jomal do Brasil" are tired. (4) 
Topic: the older children
DRR Output:
The older children are selling O 
Globo or selling Jomal do Brasil
.81 .75
The older children are tired .86 .80 .95 .94
Other
4. The children who are dancing 
the quadrilha are wearing straw 
hats. (3)
All the children are in 
schoolyard. (2)
The children in the schoolyard 
who are wearing straw hats are 
not tired. (1) 
Topic: the children who are 
dancing the quadrilha (a 
Brazilian folk dance)
DRR Output::
The children dancing the 
quadrilha are wearing straw hats 
in the schoolyard.
.71 .80
The children dancing the 
quadrilha are not tired
.90 .95 1.00 1.00
Other
5. The children who are painting 
are from Piedade. (a 
neighborhood) (1)
All the children are boys.(4)
All the boys from Piedade are in 
school (3)
None of the children in school 
are listening to music. (2) 
Topic: the children who are 
painting
DRR Output:
The children who are painting are 
boys
.50 .65
The children who are painting are 
in school
.81 .65
The children who are painting are 
not listening to music
.81 .80 .95 .88
Other
6. All the happy children are 
either playing tennis or 
swimming. (2)
The children who are playing 
tennis are at the country club. (4)
The children who are swimming 
are at the country club.(3)
There are no boys at the country 
club.(1) 
Topic: the children who are 
happy
DRR Output:
The happy children are at the 
country club
.90 .85
The happy children are not boys .81 .85 .70 .88
Other
7. The tanned children are on the 
beach.(1)
There are no children reading 
books on the beach.(3)
Every child is either reading a 
book or playing volleyball.(2) 
Topic: the tanned children
DRR Output::
The tanned children are not 
reading books
.48 .75
The tanned children are playing 
volleyball
1.00 .95 1.00 1.00
Other
8. Some of the children are 
orphans.(3)
The children who are orphans are 
either playing or studying.(2)
None of the children are 
playing.(4)
There are no happy children who 
are studying.(1) 
Topic: the children who are 
orphans
DRR Output::
The orphans are studying .95 .90
The orphans are not happy .90 .90 .95 1.00
Other
9. Some of the children are from 
Pernambuco.(3)
All the children are either in a 
school trip or on a family 
holiday.(1)
The children on a family holiday 
are wearing bathing suits.(4)
The children on a school trip are 
wearing school uniforms. (2) 
Topic: the children from 
Pernambuco
DRR Output::
The children from Pernambuco 
are either on a school trip or on a 
family holiday
.67 .40
The children from Pernambuco 
are wearing bathing suits or 
school uniforms
.43 .80 1.00 1.00
Other
10. The younger children are not 
in their classrooms.(1)
All the children are in their
classrooms or in the 
playground.(3)
There are no children in the 
playground who are wearing red 
shirts.(2) 
Topic: the younger children
DRR Output::
The younger children are in the 
playground
.95 1.00
The younger children are not 
wearing red shirts
.95 .95 .95 1.00
Other
11. The deaf children are in either 
"Colégio Conviver" or "Colégio 
Atual".(a Colégio is a high 
school) (6) 
None of the children in "Colégio 
Atual" play basketball.(3)
None of the children in "Colégio 
Conviver" play basketball.(10)
Every child plays either football 
or basketball.(2)
None of the children who play 
football get good marks.(5)
The children either get good 
marks or win prizes. (4) 
Topic: the deaf children
DRR Output::
None of the deaf children play 
basketball
.52 .70
The deaf children play football ( 1.00 .85
None of the deaf children get 
good marks
.86 .80
The deaf children win prizes .76 .85 1.00 .82
Other
12. The boys from "Colégio 
Positivo" speak English. (a 
Colégio is a high school) (2)
The boys from "Colégio Equipe" 
speak English.(3)
All the children are either from 
"Colégio Positivo" or from 
"Colegito Equipe".(1)
The children who speak English 
are older. (5)
None of the older children is 
wearing a school uniform. (4) 
Topic: the boys
DRR Output::
The boys are from Colegio 
Positivo or Colegio Equipe
.24 .40
The boys speak English .95 .90
The boys are older .86 .85
None of the boys is wearing a 
school uniform
.86 .90 .67 .87
Other
13. Some of the short children are 
not eating hamburgers. (2)
All the children are eating either 
hamburgers or coxinhas (chicken 
buns).(3)
There are no thin children eating 
coxinhas (1) 
Topic: the short children
DRR Output::
Some of the short children are .71 .90
eating coxinhas
Some of the short children are 
not thin
.67 .70 1.00 1.00
Other
14. All the children from Olinda 
are either fat or thin. (2)
The fat children eat pizza and 
drink guaraná. (a popular soft 
drink) (3)
The thin children drink 
guaraná.(1)
There are no children on a diet 
who drink guaraná.(4) 
Topic: the children from Olinda
DRR Output:
The children from Olinda drink 
guaraná
.52 .65
There are no children from 
Olinda on a diet
.48 .80 1.00 1.00
Other
15. The children from Olinda are 
either thirsty or hungry.(2)
None of the children are 
thirsty.(3)
There are no hungry children 
standing in the queue.(1) 
Topic: the children from Olinda
DRR Output::
The children from Olinda are 
hungry
.71 .95
The children from Olinda are not 
standing in the queue
.86 .90 1.00 1.00
Other
16. The girls are eating ice cream 
and none of them are using 
napkins.(4)
All the children are either wiping 
their mouths on their sleeves or 
using napkins.(3)
None of the children wiping their 
mouths on their sleeves are well 
behaved.(2)
All of the children are either well 
behaved or mischievous.(1) 
Topic: the girls
DRR Output::
The girls are wiping their mouths 
on their sleeves
.90 .95
None of the girls are well 
behaved
.86 .90
The girls are mischievous .86 .95 .94 1.00
Other
17. The fat children are eating 
hamburgers.(4)
There are no children on the 
beach eating hamburgers.(1)
Every child is either at the park 
or on the beach.(2)
The children at the park are 
playing football.(1) 
Topic: the fat children
DRR Output::
The fat children are not on the 
beach
.70 .90
The fat children are at the park .90 .90
The fat children are playing 
football
.95 .90 .95 1.00
Other
18. Some of the children in the 
playground are playing tennis.(2)
There are no girls playing 
tennis.(1)
Every child either is a girl or is 
wearing a hat.(3) 
Topic: the children in the 
playground
DRR Output:
Some of the children in the 
playground are not girls
.86 .75
Some of the children in the 
playground are wearing a hat
.81 .85 1.00 .93
Other
19. The street children are in 
"Boa Viagem". (a neighborhood) 
(2)
The street children are not selling 
newspapers.(4)
All of the children are selling 
either newspapers or candies.(1)
The children in "Boa Viagem" 
who are selling candy are 
dancing.(3) 
Topic: the street children
DRR Output::
The street children are selling 
candies
.57 .65
The street children are selling 
candy in Boa Viagem
.71 .75
The street children are dancing 1.00 .95 1.00 1.00
Other
20. Some of the children who 
won a scholarship are eating in a 
McDonalds restaurant. (4)
Every child is in the Recife 
Shopping Center.(1)
All of the children who are eating 
in a McDonalds restaurant in the 
Recife Shopping Center are 
drinking guaraná. (a popular soft 
drink) (2)
There are no children in red shirts 
who are drinking guaraná. (3) 
Topic: the children who won a 
scholarship
DRR Output::
Some the children who won a 
scholarship are eating in a 
McDonalds in the Recife 
Shopping Center
.71 .80
Some of the children who won a 
scholarship are drinking guaraná
.81 .75
Some of the children who won a 
scholarship are not in red shirts
.71 .80 1.00 1.00
Other
Note: The notation and organization are the same as for Table 1.
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